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Abstract 
Most large UK private-sector organisations are listed companies that are subject 
to intense pressures to enhance shareholder value. The question arises of 
whether this constrains the ability of UK managers to pursue genuine 
partnership arrangements with long-term stakeholders, including employees. 
Empirical evidence is presented in the form of case studies of partnership 
relations between labour and management since the mid-1990s in companies 
operating under different forms of ownership. While some companies have been 
able to reconcile shareholder demands with a ‘partnership’ approach, in other 
cases, shareholder pressure has undermined partnership relations of the kind 
which have endured under more concentrated forms of ownership. Where the 
corporate governance system can be seen to support partnership, it is in 
conjunction with market regulation underpinning quality standards, relative 
stability in product markets, and a willingness on the part of senior management 
to mediate between the claims of different stakeholder groups.  
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PARTNERSHIP, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: 
THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This paper examines ‘partnership’ models of production organisation, 
their meaning, functioning and effectiveness, and the ability of parties 
to develop, implement and maintain such relationships in the context 
of different markets, regulatory frameworks and systems of corporate 
governance. Corporate governance has been variously defined. Mayer 
(1997) argues that corporate governance is concerned with aligning 
the interests of investors and managers to ensure that firms are run for 
the benefit of shareholders. By contrast, Deakin and Hughes (1997) 
view corporate governance as concerned with the relationship 
between internal governance mechanisms and society’s conception of 
the scope for corporate accountability. Within this broader definition, 
corporate governance can be seen to include structures, processes, 
cultures and systems designed to promote organisational 
effectiveness.1 From this perspective, the ‘partnership’ model of 
production organisation offers an approach by which labour and 
management can achieve mutually beneficial outcomes by improving 
the quality of labour and employment relations and more closely co-
operating with the objective of enhancing business performance.  
 
Most large private-sector organisations in the UK are listed 
companies that are subject to intense pressures to enhance shareholder 
value. In principle, UK company law allows boards to take a view 
based on ‘enlightened shareholder value.’2 This assumes that the long-
run interests of shareholders and other stakeholders essentially 
coincide.3 In practice, however, the capacity of boards to mediate 
between the interests of different stakeholder groups may be 
constrained by features of the corporate governance system for listed 
companies. These include the dispersed nature of share ownership, the 
vulnerability of companies to hostile take-over bids, and pressures 
from institutional investors for  quarterly improvements in earnings. 
 4 
As a result, the UK system of corporate governance may place a 
constraint on the ability of UK-based corporations to pursue genuine 
partnership arrangements with stakeholders (suppliers, customers, 
communities and above all, labour) whose interests are, in the final 
analysis, subordinated to those of equity investors. Direct conflicts 
between stakeholder groups may be unavoidable, with negative 
consequences for long-run performance. 
 
Empirical evidence is brought to bear on these questions by 
examining the evolution of corporate strategy since the mid-1990s in 
a small number of case-study companies operating under different 
forms of ownership. These include UK-listed companies that have 
been actively involved in take-overs and mergers while at the same 
time promoting ‘partnership’ with trade unions. Their experience is 
contrasted to that of comparator companies operating in the UK under 
continental European ownership, in which the controlling equity stake 
is held by a long-term, dominant ‘block-holder.’ From these cases, it 
is evident that some UK companies have been able to reconcile 
shareholder demands with a ‘partnership’ approach, and have used the 
market for corporate control to advance this philosophy at the expense 
of rivals adopting a more adversarial (and in practice less effective) 
philosophy. However, in other cases, shareholder pressure has 
undermined partnership relations of the kind which have endured 
under more concentrated forms of ownership. Overall, corporate 
governance can be seen to play a significant role in the development 
of partnership arrangements and the ability of firms to sustain them 
over time. 
 
The order of the paper is as follows. Section two examines the 
governance of production relationships and the emergence of co-
operation in production from an historical legacy of managerial 
prerogative and conflictual industrial relationships. It also reviews the 
development and implementation of industrial partnership in the UK 
since 1979, in response to competitive and economic difficulties. 
Section three examines the UK system of corporate governance, its 
influence on relationships and interactions among stakeholder groups 
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and its potential for interfering with the ability of parties to maintain 
partnership in employment relations. Section four presents the case 
evidence and analysis. Section five draws conclusions from the 
previous discussion and discusses policy implications that arise from 
the analysis. 
 
II. The governance of production relations and the case for co-
operation 
 
The historical backdrop to the partnership debate is the apparent 
competitive failure of Taylorism. Long considered to be the most 
advanced form of capitalist work organisation, the essence of 
Taylorism was its acceptance of the superiority of top-down 
management in the conceptualisation, direction, co-ordination and 
control of production. Its application rested on managerial prerogative 
and the belief that employment relations are naturally antagonistic.  
 
a.  Managerial prerogative and conflictual industrial relations 
Managerial prerogative and conflictual industrial relations evolved 
with the development of modern capitalism, as technology and 
managerial authority was progressively substituted for workers’ skills 
and co-ordination. The task content of jobs was simplified, and 
workers’ discretion over the execution and pace of work was reduced 
by mechanisation (which embedded the co-ordinating and control 
functions in the machine) and by scientific management (which 
developed the co-ordinating and command function of management). 
The hierarchical command structuring of management was reinforced 
by the contract of employment, which underpinned ‘managerial 
prerogative,’ and granted managers rights to the ‘co-operation’ of 
employees in areas not covered by implicit or explicit agreements. It 
therefore vested in the employer powers that went ‘beyond contract.’4  
 
The problem with this traditional form of work organisation was the 
support it gave to mutual antagonism and low trust relationships 
between workers and managers, which together seriously limited any 
possibility of collaboration.5 The prospects for partnership were 
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therefore bleak and industrial relations became premised on a 
‘behavioural acceptance of divergent purpose.’6 Us against them 
attitudes prevailed and both sides carefully guarded their separate 
interests by limiting mutual dependence, restricting information, 
resisting concession and readily resorting to sanctions.7 Collective 
bargaining, where it emerged, provided a basis for compromise and for 
the regulation of conflict. But it required that unions accept managerial 
prerogative as a condition for management’s recognition of the right of 
unions to represent their members, and to negotiate on their behalf the 
terms and conditions of employment and the effects of management 
decisions.8 Collective bargaining therefore lent additional institutional 
weight to hierarchical managerial structures and power relationships 
whilst ameliorating their effects and providing procedures for securing 
agreements and resolving disputes. 
 
The Taylorist system of production organisation operated most 
effectively in the US during the immediate post World War II period. In 
this era, it was combined with technological leadership and large-scale 
mass production, and a macro-economic environment of high demand, 
protected domestic markets and limited competition. However, 
Taylorism was soon subjected to both internal and external challenges. 
 
a.1. The challenge from within: the development of HRM 
The performance downside of traditional forms of production 
organisation has long been recognised, even by proponents of 
capitalism.9 Reflecting on a life-time of production management, and 
social and industrial research and experimentation, in which well-
being and mutual dependence was a central focus, Seebohm Rowntree 
wrote in 1921: 
‘The attempt to establish an ideal working environment is not the 
fad of a sentimentalist, nor is it a counsel of perfection, which can 
only be operated by a wealthy firm. If workers are to co-operate 
in producing a high output of goods, which will compete 
successfully in world markets, they rightly demand, in their 
working lives, conditions which will enable and encourage them 
to give of their best.’10  
 7 
The benefits of collective employee involvement and the negative 
effects of unrestricted managerial prerogative were also underlined in 
the 1930’s Hawthorne Experiment, as well as by the Tavistock 
Institute’s war-time experiments and their peacetime industrial 
applications.11  
 
Human Resource Management (HRM) built upon these early 
developments, drawing on industrial psychology theories of 
motivation, behavioural theories of job enlargement and enrichment, 
and organisational behaviour theories of better communication and 
employee involvement. HRM embraces the notion that firms will reap 
the rewards of greater worker motivation and improved job 
performance resulting from increased job satisfaction, enlarged and 
enriched job content, additional challenges and opportunities for 
workers, and new skill development. Workers’ interests are engaged 
by designing wage systems that recognise individual differences and 
reward employees accordingly. In contrast to the hierarchical system 
of industrial relations (IR), HRM fosters pre-emptive rather than re-
active approaches to operational efficiency, quality control and 
process development.12 It emphasises joint participation in 
production-related activities and decision-making and shifts 
accountability and decision-making to the lowest appropriate level in 
the organisation, with the objective of maximising ‘organisational 
integration, employee commitment, flexibility and the quality of 
work.’13 Despite these advantages, HRM has been slow to take root in 
Britain and has only recently emerged to challenge the traditionally 
more conflictual IR approach as the dominant system of internal 
governance in UK businesses.  
 
a.2.  The challenge from outside: co-operation and 
competitiveness  
The major challenge to traditional forms of work organisation in Britain 
came not from internal reforms, but rather, from the demonstrated 
competitive superiority of more co-operative forms of industrial 
organisation, largely by foreign producers. This new competition14 is 
broadly based on higher quality, improved design, greater variety more 
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rapid product and process innovation and lower costs. It was launched 
by Japanese, German, Italian, Swedish and other producers who had 
evolved co-operative employment relations and relational contracting 
arrangements with their suppliers and customers.15 The effect was the 
generation of high levels of operational and dynamic efficiency, largely 
as a consequence of mobilising and improving worker and supplier 
commitment, skills and knowledge. High levels of competitive 
performance rest on the recognition of the mutuality of interests and the 
ability to maximise these by building high-trust, partnership 
relationships.16 Such co-operative arrangements are supported by the 
state, trade associations, trade unions, and other organisations and 
institutions which intervene by setting norms, rules and standards for 
regulating market and other relations between the social partners.  
 
b.  From hierarchical management to industrial partnership  
In response to increasing competitive pressures and difficulties, in 
1979, the Conservative government focused on the perceived need to 
restore to management the right to manage within the traditional 
system of IR. Worker organisation was weakened by unemployment 
and by anti-trade union legislation. However, the failure of this 
strategy to stem the decline in UK competitiveness helps to explain 
why, especially during the 1990s, more and more companies have 
been re-assessing their HRM strategies and turning to more co-
operative forms of work organisation.  
 
Following this trend, the ‘New’ Labour Government, elected in 1997, 
endorsed labour-management co-operation and ‘partnership’ as an 
effective approach for improving economic performance. Tony Blair 
identified the Labour government’s primary industrial relations 
objective as being ‘nothing less than to change the culture of relations 
in and at work,’ based on the assumption that ‘efficiency and fairness 
are wholly compatible.’ He stressed the need for the new culture to be 
‘one of voluntary understanding and co-operation because it has been 
recognised that the prosperity of each (employer and employee) is 
bound up in the prosperity of all.’ He emphasised that ‘partnership 
works best when it is about real goals – part of a strategy for instance 
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for doubling business. Or bringing employee relations in line with 
market re-positioning. Or ending the often-meaningless ritual of 
annual wage squabbling.’17  
 
Wood (2000), too, distances partnership from the ‘zero-sum haggling’ 
of pre-Thatcher collective bargaining, interpreting the new system to 
be:  
‘one of partnership at work … associated with the kind of model 
of HRM … focused on the achievement of a particular role 
orientation on the part of employees so that they are flexible, 
expansive in their perceptions and willing contributors to 
innovation.’18  
 
He goes on to suggest that:  
‘Partnership is a matter of employers having the right to ask 
employees to develop themselves in order to accept fresh 
responsibilities whilst they themselves must take responsibility 
for providing the context in which this can happen. In the 
terminology of principal-agent theory, it is about employers 
having a concern for the employability of the employees and in 
so doing acting as an agent for their development and security.’19  
 
In this formulation of partnership, the strong emphasis is on the need 
for workers to make largely unconditional commitments to their 
employer’s business, and to mould themselves to its needs. In this 
way, workers provide additional and improved resources for the 
firm’s managers to manage more effectively.  
 
In Wood’s view, ‘there is nothing in the notion of partnership to link 
it exclusively with unions.’20 In Wood’s conception, then, the 
traditional belief in the superiority of managerialism is retained, but 
the employing organisation is redefined as being a ‘unitary’ system, in 
which all interests are assumed to be in common. Workers are 
required to adopt a unitarian corporate culture and to equip themselves 
to participate in team work, quality circles, total quality management 
and other HRM approaches. In this process, they are forced to relax 
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practices and reveal information, the control over which had previously 
been used in bargaining with management. In this form, partnership is 
incompatible with traditional ‘pluralistic’ industrial relations systems, 
which recognise differences of interest across stakeholder groups. 
Nevertheless, workers’ representatives may have a role to play by their 
incorporation into managerial processes, through engagement with 
works councils or other integrating institutions. Thus, if collective 
bargaining is to have any role, it is suggested, it must be ‘integrative’ 
rather than ‘distributive.’21 Further, if trade unions are to have any part 
to play, instead of competing with management, they must assume the 
role of co-ordinators of the strategic process and facilitate the 
achievement of managerial objectives, which are seen to forward the 
mutual interest of all the firm’s stakeholders.  
 
As might be expected, the Trade Union Congress (TUC), although 
committing itself partnership, is more bipartisan in approach and 
places stronger emphasis on the terms and conditions for partnership. 
In its May 1999 by Partners for Progress – New Unionism at the 
Workplace, the TUC advocated enterprise-level industrial partnership 
and identified six underlying principles:  
‘(1) a shared commitment to the success of the organisation; (2) a 
commitment by the employer to employment security in return 
for which the union agrees to a higher level of functional 
flexibility in the work place; (3) a renewed focus on the quality of 
working life, giving workers access to opportunities to improve 
their skills, focusing attention on improving job content and 
enriching the quality of work; (4) openness and a willingness to 
share information; (5) adding value – unions, workers and 
employers must see that partnership is delivering measurable 
improvements; and (6) a recognition by both the union and 
employer that they each have different and legitimate interests.’22 
 
c.  Co-operation and conflict in partnership relations 
There is no doubt of the advantage of co-operation in production. It 
allows for the full exploitation of the technical complementarities 
inherent to production and facilitates the sharing of knowledge 
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necessary for the effectiveness of productive systems and their 
improvement.23 It also fuels the organisational learning processes by 
which new information and knowledge are created, incorporated and 
diffused, and by which new products, processes and organisational 
forms are developed.24 The resulting operational and dynamic 
efficiencies are crucial determinants of the ability of organisations to 
compete effectively, and to respond flexibly to changing 
circumstances and new opportunities.  
 
But it does not follow from the centrality of co-operation in 
production that organisations are necessarily unitary. However mutual 
the interests of workers and the organisation that employs them may 
be in production, there is an inevitable competition over the 
distribution of proceeds from that co-operation among the various 
stakeholder groups. In this context, pressure from the annual wage 
‘squabbling’ is no more or less meaningless than pressures from other 
claimants: for example, the pressure exerted on companies to 
regularly report increases in earnings to the stock market; the pressure 
from consumer groups on utilities regulators to cut prices; or, for that 
matter, the political pressure exerted on behalf of taxpayers, 
determining the money available to pay for the public sector services 
taxpayers demand. These hagglings, with their potentially negative-
sum consequences for employees, shape the environment within 
which decisions are made regarding whether or not to co-operate or to 
form partnerships.  
 
Difficulties in predicting outcomes are also important for decisions 
about commitments for which the pay-off is long-term. Important in 
this respect are the changes in technology, resource availability, 
consumer tastes and other developments that constitute largely 
unavoidable economic uncertainties. Other uncertainties are inherent 
to the institutional framework in which partnership agreements are 
concluded. The co-operating workers are not the only principals for 
whom managers are agents. Managers are required to operate in the 
interest of shareholders and, in the case of utilities, the interests of 
customers as represented by regulators. The ability of management to 
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fully commit themselves to long-term partnership arrangements may 
be similarly constrained by uncertainty about the actions of dominant 
suppliers and customers. The priority managers are required to give to 
these different interests will be importantly determined by the 
priorities enshrined in corporate governance, regulatory, employment 
and competition law, as well as by the relative bargaining leverage 
corporate mangers can exert on those with whom they are required to 
deal. As currently constituted, the laws affecting the corporation and 
its practice assigns low priority to the interests of the workforce upon 
which competitive performance largely depends. Regardless of their 
views on the matter, managers are required to put the interests of 
others first, and in exchange for the unconditional commitment they 
demand of their workforce, managers can make, at best, only 
conditional promises.  
 
III. The framework of corporate governance in the UK: 
constraint or opportunity? 
 
When we turn to examine the rules and institutions that constitute the 
UK system of corporate governance, the importance of the wider 
context of labour-management relations becomes clear. Corporate 
governance is essentially concerned with issues of ownership and 
control within the enterprise. Ownership matters, in the sense that the 
legal allocation of property rights among the different stakeholders 
affects their incentives and, therefore, the effectiveness with which 
co-operation can be achieved. From this perspective, management and 
labour do not simply have to deal with each other. Both are subject to 
the wider interests and claims of the dominant stakeholders who make 
up the ‘residual claimants’25 or ‘holders of the beneficial interest’26 in 
the enterprise. It becomes important, then, to specify more precisely 
the nature of these interests and claims, the degree to which the legal-
institutional system accords them priority, and their impact on 
productive relations within the enterprise. 
 
Different corporate forms give rise to different patterns of ownership. In 
the case of most limited companies, ordinary shareholders are the 
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‘residual claimants,’ entitled to what is left from the income stream 
after the contractual claims of employees, commercial creditors and 
others have been met. It follows that because they are the last to receive 
anything in the event of insolvency, they assume the risk of failure. 
Conversely, shareholders gain in proportion to the company’s success. 
Although, in law, they are not entitled to receive a dividend, in practice, 
the linking of dividends to corporate performance links shareholder 
returns directly to the success or failure of the enterprise. They also 
benefit through the increase in the capital value of their shares.  
 
Shareholders do not own the company, nor do they literally own its 
assets. But by virtue of the rules of company law and corporate 
governance practice, the ownership of common voting stock does give 
them certain ownership rights as residual claimants which have 
important implications for incentives and hence for efficiency. In 
particular, shareholders can dispose of their shares in the stock market, 
providing a way by which control of the corporation can be transferred. 
The orthodox view in the Anglo-American system is that the ability of 
shareholders to vote with their feet enhances the organisational 
efficiency of the enterprise. Their incentive to do so is said to arise 
from the fact that shareholder income is directly connected to the 
success or failure of the firm. In effect, the stock market becomes a 
market for corporate control, in which rival management teams bid to 
persuade shareholders to sell them controlling interests by offering 
them a premium over current share prices.  
 
It can be argued that employees and other long-term stakeholders may 
have just as valid a claim as shareholders do to be considered the 
residual claimants. This is because they are equally likely to make 
relation-specific investments (in human capital, for example) which 
will be at risk if the enterprise fails.27 The response of orthodox 
corporate governance theorists is that while it may be the case that 
many groups have a stake in the firm, only the shareholders have 
sufficient interests in common of effectively hold managers to 
account.28 Compromises in the pre-eminent rights of shareholders 
embodied in, for example, codetermination laws and laws requiring 
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employee consultation, are said to be inherently inefficient, and to 
survive only because the costs of unraveling politically-motivated 
compromises are too high.29  
 
A large proportion of UK productive capacity, in relative terms, is 
held in the form of publicly-listed companies, that is to say, 
companies whose shares are listed on the London stock exchange 
and/or on one or more of a number of overseas exchanges. The 
predominant type of ownership in UK publicly-listed companies may 
be described as dispersed-shareholder ownership. The principal 
shareholders are institutions - insurance companies and pension funds 
- who invest on behalf of their policy-holders and beneficiaries 
respectively. They vest the day-to-day control and management of 
their shareholdings in fund managers - investment banks and other 
specialist investors - who act as their agents. Typically, the share 
structure of a listed company will consist of several blocks (of 
between 5 and 10 percent) that are controlled by fund managers on 
behalf of a number of clients. By contrast, the dominant block-holding 
model, in which one shareholder holds a majority or near-majority 
stake, is rare in UK listed companies. Methods for securing dominant 
blocks through cross-shareholdings by large companies in one another 
(which are common in France, and by bank-led governance of the 
kind that operates (in various different ways) in Germany and Japan)30 
are the exception in the UK. 
 
In general, dispersed shareholder ownership strongly privileges exit 
over voice as the mechanism by which shareholders can exercise 
control over management. The deep liquidity of the London stock 
exchange means that there is a highly active market for the shares of 
UK listed companies. The threat of shareholders exiting corporations 
is therefore a meaningful one. The disadvantage of dispersed 
ownership comes in the form of the high costs of effectively 
coordinating the direct involvement of shareholders in the conduct of 
corporate affairs. To some extent, this problem may be overcome 
through coordinated actions of institutional shareholders (or, more 
accurately, the fund managers who represent them). Where five or six 
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institutions between them hold a majority or near-majority stake, it 
seems that they can exercise powerful influence behind the scenes in 
the ongoing management of companies.  
 
A more tangible mechanism for overcoming costs of dispersed 
shareholder voting is the hostile take-over. A hostile take-over is, in 
effect, an appeal to the shareholders of a listed company to sell out en 
masse to an external bidder. The shareholders are induced to exit the 
scene by the offer of a premium on top of the current value of their 
shares, the cost of which the new owner will aim to recover by 
restructuring the company. The collective action costs of voting in 
response to a ‘tender offer’ of this kind are reduced by regulation - a 
combination of provisions of the Companies Acts and the City Code 
on Take-overs and Mergers - that enables minority shareholders, who 
would otherwise ‘hold out’ against the offer in the hope of getting a 
better deal, to be compulsorily bought out. Conversely, minority 
shareholders receive strong protection against expropriation by 
majorities during a bid. Two-tier offers, partial bids and other 
techniques that seek to lever a bid by offering differential terms to 
particular shareholders are, in effect, banned. Other rules of UK 
securities law and practice make it nearly impossible for the managers 
of a listed company to put in place advance protection against hostile 
bids. Such protection might include the issuing of non-voting stock or 
the implementation of various ‘poison pill’ defenses that are much 
more regularly observed in the USA.31  
 
The overall effect is to further encourage dispersion of ownership. 
Large cross-shareholdings are rare, due in part to the fact that under 
the City Code, they would trigger an obligation to launch a 
‘mandatory’ bid for control. This in turn would most likely lead to an 
expensive process of buying out minority shareholders. Minority 
shareholders are encouraged to take small stakes, knowing that they 
are in general safe from the predatory actions of major shareholders. 
 
The more general effect of these rules is to entrench shareholder 
value as the dominant objective of corporate management. The source 
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for this norm is only partially located in UK company law, providing 
weak support for the notion that companies are run for their 
shareholders as ‘owners’ of the enterprise. Since the late nineteenth 
century, UK company law has largely aimed to protect the autonomy 
of boards from day-to-day shareholder pressures. The legal notion that 
directors must act in good faith in the interests of the company, rather 
than the shareholders, means that boards have considerable leeway in 
taking a long-term view of what is in the best interest of stakeholders 
as a whole. This is reinforced by legislation requiring boards to 
consider the interests of employees alongside those of shareholders 
when exercising fiduciary duties as well as by case-law recognising 
that creditors, too, have claims as residual owners when the company 
approaches insolvency.32 Boards, then, are permitted to take a view 
based on ‘enlightened shareholder value’ – which seeks to strike a 
balance between the competing interests of the different stakeholders 
- if their objective is to benefit the shareholders in the long run. For 
example, in most cases, it would be legally open to the directors to 
pursue a policy of minimum redundancies (to gain the co-operation of 
the workforce) or a preferred supplier policy (to enhance the quality 
of supplier relations), if the ultimate objective of these policies is to 
advance the long-term interests of shareholders. 
 
However, when the impact of company law is considered together 
with the operation of securities regulation -- the rules of the City Code 
together with the listing rules and other codes of good practice issued 
by the financial authorities or by investor representatives such as the 
Association of British Insurers, -- the picture is quite different. The 
room for maneuver of boards of listed companies is now much more 
limited.33 During a hostile take-over bid, the boards of target 
companies are required to assume a neutral stance and offer 
disinterested advice to shareholders on the financial merits of the bid. 
Although the rules of the Code require bidders to state their intentions 
with regard to the future treatment of employees, this results in little 
more than the insertion of standard-form legal ‘boilerplate’ in offer 
documents. There is no obligation on the part of either the target 
board of the board of the bidder to consult employee representatives 
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during a bid; this only occurs after a bid has gone through when large-
scale redundancies are announced. There is even some doubt as to 
how far either board may go in providing information to employee 
representatives without contravening the provisions of the Code and 
the listing rules on the disclosure of price-sensitive information. These 
rules, together with the doctrine of ‘pre-emption’ (which makes it 
impractical for most listed companies to issue non-voting stock as a 
way of beating off a take-over bid), create particular incentives for 
boards to prioritise short-term shareholder interests over other 
interests during a bid.  
 
Conversely, the prevailing system of executive compensation in the 
UK provides incentives for boards to engage in hostile take-over 
activity. In particular, share-option schemes that link director 
remuneration directly to the performance of company stock encourage 
boards to forestall possible share price declines by such things as 
engaging in restructurings and initiating strategies for expansion 
through hostile take-over. These strategies, while not required by the 
general rules of company law, are not actively discouraged by them 
either. Despite the legal principle that makes it compulsory for boards 
to take into account the interests of employees when exercising 
fiduciary duties, employees have no standing to challenge a particular 
decision or commercial transaction. Nor do employees have any 
standing before the City Panel on Take-overs and Mergers. 
 
By international standards, there is a high level of hostile take-over 
activity in the UK. Even so, the numbers of hostile bids in a given 
year will be in the tens rather than the hundreds, whereas the number 
of listed companies runs into the thousands.34 More significant is the 
long shadow cast over corporate governance by the Code and by the 
listing rules. No listed company is immune from the possibility of a 
hostile bid. To varying degrees, companies can insulate themselves 
against short-term fluctuations in their share price relative to the 
market by cultivating a culture of long-term investment. But this is 
not an option open to all; and there is question as to whether it is 
continuously available for any. In practice, the take-over mechanism 
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has been the principal catalyst for corporate restructuring in the UK 
during the last decade; and virtually no industrial or services sector 
has escaped the changes induced by take-over activity. The corporate 
governance rules clearly have a wider effect on the economy and 
industrial structure of the UK.  
 
The more specific issue we wish to address here is whether the 
dispersed shareholder model constrains the development of a 
‘partnership’ approach in employment relations in the UK. The 
hallmark of an effective partnership is that parties give open-ended 
commitment to co-operate based on their expectation that significant 
benefits will result for them. Important factors for creating such 
expectations can be expected to include: fairness of treatment, job 
satisfaction, high quality of work environment and, particularly, 
income and job security. However, the decision to co-operate and 
form a productive partnership also means giving a hostage to fortune 
because the benefits are unlikely to accrue immediately. When 
deciding to co-operate, it must be taken on trust by individuals that 
their action will be reciprocated. This depends on the reliability of the 
person or persons with whom the agreement is made as well as upon 
the commitment parties have from each others and the priority they 
are required to give to the latter.  
 
If managers, through the combined effect of convention and law, are 
required to prioritise shareholder value over other interests when 
decisions regarding corporate structure are made, they will be 
correspondingly less able to make ‘credible commitments’ to respect 
the long-term interests of other stakeholders, in particular, employees. 
As a result, employees for whom no meaningful guarantee of 
economic security is given would have little incentive to engage in the 
sharing of information and reciprocal learning. The prevailing system 
of corporate governance would then represent a major constraint on 
the possibilities for effective partnership in UK employment relations. 
 
We now turn to our case studies to review the empirical evidence for 
and against this proposition. 
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IV. Corporate governance and partnership in UK companies: 
Case study patterns and analysis 
 
In assessing the influence of corporate governance on the ability of 
parties to develop and maintain partnership in employment relations, 
we examined the evolution of corporate and human resources strategy 
in seven case study firms operating in the UK. All seven are unionised 
companies; six have global operations or are subsidiaries of global 
parent corporations. All have been actively involved in the market for 
corporate control during the 1990s (either through merger and 
acquisition activity or through listing or de-listing from the stock 
market) while at the same time promoting ‘partnership’ with their 
employees and unions. They are: a large specialised cleaning and 
facilities management company (‘Cleanwell UK’), a large 
manufacturing company (‘Tenswell UK’), a large telecommunications 
company (‘Hearwell’), two major multi-utilities providing electricity, 
gas and water services (‘Seewell UK’ and ‘Warmwell’), a water and 
gas company (‘Flowell UK’) and an electrical contracting company 
(‘Fixwell’). Tables 1-3 contain more detailed information on 
environmental factors, micro-level factors and financial profiles for 
each of these companies. 
 
a. Corporate governance and partnership 
The case studies paint a complex picture of the relationship between 
corporate governance models and the sustainability of partnership in 
employment relations.  
 
a.1. Concentrated ownership and partnership 
In companies where share ownership is not dispersed, we find strong 
evidence that concentrated ownership can provide a foundation for 
partnership. In one case, the company’s five managing directors 
organised a management buyout in order to allow the firm to more 
easily pursue its chosen business objectives in a difficult economic 
environment. Fixwell is now owned wholly by its five directors, 
following a management buy-out in 1997; and there are no plans to 
float on the stock market. According to the Personnel Director, the 
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absence of external shareholders has allowed the company to ‘not get 
blown off course during difficult trading conditions’ and to maintain 
its commitment to high ethical standards and a high quality service. 
‘We can grow at our own pace, we can make decisions that are 
sensible to us as a commercial organisation. There’s no one else to 
please other than the five directors.’ 
 
In another case where partnership was described by the union as 
‘mature and deep,’ the company (Cleanwell UK) is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of a continental European company (Cleanwell 
International). In this case, prior to 2000, approximately half of voting 
shares were controlled by five main holdings, two of these being 
continental European public sector pension funds and one a 
continental European bank. Cleanwell International shares are 
primarily listed on a continental European stock exchange, with a 
secondary listing on the London Stock Exchange. The trade union at 
Cleanwell UK felt that the continental European model was an 
‘important influence’ on the company’s approach to HR strategy and 
union relations. Still, it is important to stress that even under this 
model, the corporate group’s focus is on the creation of shareholder 
value; and its current business objective is to double turnover, 
operating profit and earnings per share by 2005. The significance for 
partnership is that the group is able to commit to growing the business 
over the longer-term. According to its 2000 Annual Report, Cleanwell 
International ‘believes that management, employees and shareholders 
share common long-term interests.’ In 2000, Cleanwell International’s 
Chief Executive said, ‘we do not believe in ‘management by quarter’, 
with big dividends, fragmentation of the business with a view to short 
term profit, etc.’ The company does not pay a dividend, preferring to 
fund further investment. According to Cleanwell UK’s Finance 
Director in 2001, the pressure felt from shareholders and bankers is to 
demonstrate ‘credibility of management,’ by delivering what is 
promised. 
 
In 2000, Cleanwell International’s corporate governance environment 
changed significantly as Cleanwell increased its issued share capital 
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by 5.1 percent to fund acquisitions, and merged the voting and capital 
shares into a single class. As a result, its shareholder base is now 
much more dispersed, with only one pension scheme holding more 
than 5 percent of the share capital. The geographical distribution of 
shares has also shifted such that 30 percent of investors are 
continental European, while 56 percent are Anglo-American. Despite 
this change in share ownership, there is still strong evidence of 
Cleanwell’s commitment to partnership with its employees. In 2000, 
the Group launched a new HR strategy as ‘a core element’ of the 
Group’s business strategy, and set up a corporate HR function ‘to 
strengthen its employee development efforts.’ Although it may be 
early to tell, according to the UK Finance Director, changing share 
ownership is not a negative factor for partnership because new 
investors know what they are buying into.  
 
While conducive to partnership, concentrated ownership does not 
guarantee that it will be supported. In one company (Flowell UK), we 
found evidence that a single block shareholding by a continental 
European parent can also serve as a constraint and perhaps even be 
destructive of partnership working practices. In May 2000, Flowell 
UK became a wholly owned subsidiary of a continental European 
multi-utility company, Flowell International, which had previously 
held 48.3 percent of Flowell UK’s equity. According to Flowell UK’s 
Managing Director in 2001, the continental European parent could be 
rated at seven or eight (out of ten) in terms of taking a long-term 
approach (compared with a rating of one for an American and two for 
a UK parent). Nevertheless, he told us that pressure from a single 
shareholder (to return a satisfactory dividend) is felt all the more 
intensely than pressure from dispersed shareholders. There is now 
substantial evidence of the breakdown of partnership in employment 
relations at Flowell UK. Following the take-over, work has been 
increasingly contracted out and there is now an even greater ‘culture 
of insecurity [that] runs right the way through the company, from the 
top to the bottom.’  
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a.2. Dispersed ownership and partnership 
Having considered the evidence on alternative models of share 
ownership and partnership, we now consider the influence of the UK 
system of dispersed share ownership on the sustainability of 
partnership in employment relations in our case study firms.  
 
Despite an historical legacy of partnership prior to privatisation, the 
case of Tenswell UK provides the strongest evidence of the claim that 
the pressure to deliver continual returns to shareholders (as dominant 
stakeholders) can have a destructive impact on partnership with 
employees. In 1998, Tenswell’s Chairman said: ‘[o]ur business is 
about profits and shareholder value. If it’s jobs before shareholder 
interests, the answer is no…it simply prolongs the agony.’ In 1999, 
the company merged with a large continental European manufacturer 
to become Tenswell International. Its ordinary shares are traded on 
the London and Amsterdam Stock exchanges; its American 
Depository Shares, each representing 10 ordinary shares, are listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange.  
 
According to the union, Tenswell’s UK employees now feel 
‘betrayed’ because pressure from shareholders and bankers has 
dictated company policy and it is the UK employees that have taken 
the brunt of these pressures. In February 2001, the company 
announced a major restructuring programme and the loss of 6,000 
jobs. There was no prior consultation with employee representatives, 
union proposals were rejected outright, and government ministers 
criticised Tenswell for its failure to consult with them. On the day of 
the restructuring announcement, Tenswell’s share price increased by 
11 percent. 
 
The union was particularly critical of American institutional investors. 
They were perceived to have a short-term, finance-centred view and 
to be distant from the political and social implications associated with 
plant closures in the UK. However, it is important to note here that 
although American investors represent approximately 32 percent of 
Tenswell shareholders and three US institutions own 16 percent of the 
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shares,35 a similar proportion of Cleanwell International shareholders 
are also American.36 It is also significant that the union at Tenswell 
stressed the negative influence brought to bear by a German Bank that 
owns 5 percent of Tenswell International’s shares. According to the 
union, pressure on the company from the German bank to reduce 
borrowings was a significant factor in the company’s restructuring 
plans and its decision to eliminate 6,000 jobs. This seems to run 
contrary to the perceived wisdom that German banks with cross 
shareholdings take a long-term interest in partner companies.37  
  
Although the example of Tenswell suggests that the UK system of 
corporate governance can serve as a constraint on partnership, the 
cases of Warmwell and Hearwell demonstrate that mature partnership 
can also be developed and maintained within this environment. Both 
companies have been commended by the government for their 
partnership approach to employment relations. According to the 
Personnel Director of Warmwell, ‘we have excellent relations with 
our trade unions. We sit at the table with them at the national and the 
local level. We... recognise the value of a legitimate role for the trade 
unions. Why fight? Why go back to the seventies? If there is a 
problem, we share the problem and the solution.’ At Hearwell, too, 
the union described a mature partnership, explaining that evidence 
could be found in the fact that over a two-year period, the company 
and union had negotiated a complete overhaul of the system of 
grading structures, pay and conditions. In the opinion of the union 
official we interviewed, the result was a win-win situation: the 
company achieved greater flexibility and employees achieved better 
pay and a reduced working week. According to Hearwell’s personnel 
director in 1999, ‘I hesitate to call it a partnership, although to some 
extent that’s what it has become.’  
 
Yet both companies have highly dispersed share ownership38 and in 
their Annual Reports stressed the importance of delivering value to 
shareholders. In recent years, both companies have also pursued 
strategies designed to pay high dividends relative to earnings.39 
Warmwell aims to grow its dividend by 5 percent in nominal terms 
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over the next three financial years. Hearwell told us that executive 
bonuses depend on maintaining the company’s position in the top 
thirty UK companies, based on delivering total shareholder returns 
(that is, stock value growth plus dividend flow) over a five year 
period. According to Hearwell’s Director of Strategy, shareholders are 
the company’s ‘most important’ stakeholder group.  
 
It is important to note the emphasis both companies place on 
delivering long-term shareholder value and on managing shareholder 
expectations. According to Warmwell’s 1999 Annual Report, there is 
a ‘long-term strategy of concentrating on…shareholder value’ 
(emphasis added). Warmwell’s Personnel Director told us that ‘we 
spend a lot of time trying to educate the stock market on what we’re 
about…the institutions are seeing us in a better light…All of our 
strategies are about building businesses. We believe that you can’t do 
that in the short term…In every pound that we use to acquire or to 
grow organically, we’re looking for a long term return.’ It was his 
belief that such a strategy would support the provision of regular, 
above average returns to shareholders. The union at Seewell, another 
of our case study companies but one with a less articulated form of 
partnership, stressed the importance of managing shareholder 
expectations. ‘It’s what management promises to shareholders, not 
what shareholders demand of management.’ 
 
According to Hearwell’s 2000 Annual Report, the Chief Executive 
and Group Finance Director hold meetings with the company’s 
principal institutional shareholders to discuss the company’s strategy, 
financial performance and specific major investment activities. In 
1999, Hearwell told us that ‘we have a different shareholder base to 
our competitors. We have a lot of pension funds and so on who are 
interested in long-running, continuing cash flows rather than sparky 
value appreciation and decline … I think the other thing is that we are 
quite explicit that we are a medium term stock.’ (emphasis added).40  
 
Recently, however, Hearwell has come under pressure from the 
financial markets, because debts have mounted to fund acquisitions 
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and certain investments have failed to produce expected returns. The 
response of Hearwell’s union is significant in that it specifically 
avoided making the argument that the UK model of corporate 
governance had a negative effect on partnership. It did, however, say 
that the need to satisfy the financial markets could distract 
management from developing more long-term strategies because as 
share prices fall, management tends to make ‘knee jerk reactions’ and 
attack costs, so as to demonstrate to financial analysts that some 
action is being taken.41 The union also said that it would refuse to join 
in public criticism of the company. Rather, it was urging management 
to be less defensive in managing financial analysts and more 
aggressive in publicising the company’s underlying achievements.  
 
The cases also demonstrate the potential for a mutually reinforcing 
relationship between partnership in employment relations and the UK 
system of corporate governance that encourages a high level of take-
overs and merger activity. Warmwell and Cleanwell are instructive 
cases, since both are strong partnership companies yet at the same 
time have grown shareholder value through a strategy of acquisition. 
In the case of Warmwell, partnership has been employed as a 
mechanism to assist in the take-over process. According to 
Warmwell’s personnel director, the company’s acquisition of another 
UK utility was made possible by Warmwell’s HR strategy: ‘[we] use 
our trade unions … to talk with the local unions and say “we know 
you don’t like the idea of being taken over. We don’t like the idea of 
you being taken over. But if you’re going to be taken over, it’s better 
that it’s these guys because they know what they’re going to do and 
they’ll treat you firmly but very fairly”’. Take-overs of this kind can 
be used to import the partnership philosophy into companies that were 
previously hostile to the concept. After Warmwell completed its 
acquisition, it reintroduced union recognition arrangements that the 
previous management had removed following privatisation. The 
experience of Cleanwell UK offers a further example. In 2000, 
Cleanwell UK acquired a UK listed company, which was de-listed 
following the acquisition. According to the union:  
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‘in the case of [X], the effect is overwhelmingly positive. We did 
not have any national relationship with [X] and our local 
relationships varied from the neutral to the very bad. So it has been 
a massive step forward just in terms of dialogue, ability to raise 
issues…In general terms, we see acquisitions by [Cleanwell UK ] 
positively. They seem to extend their company philosophy into the 
companies they take-over rather than importing other philosophies 
from the companies they take over.’ 
 
In short, there is a complex relationship between corporate 
governance models and the ability to sustain partnership. The case of 
Tenswell demonstrates that the framework of UK corporate 
governance can serve as a constraint on partnership by inadequately 
buttressing the consultation rights of employees. However, alternative 
models that more closely align the interests of employees with other 
stakeholders can also be a limiting or constraining influence on the 
effectiveness of partnership. What seems to be more important than 
the nature of share ownership as such is the attitude of shareholders, 
and in particular whether they wish to take a long-term view of their 
investments. However, the extent to which these attitudes are a 
product of the system of corporate governance is unclear. What is 
apparent in the cases is the fact that shareholder expectations can be 
managed, suggesting that partnership can be sustained despite of the 
UK system of corporate governance. There are also suggestions that 
the corporate governance system may favour partnership, at least in 
the sense of enabling successful experiments in partnership to provide 
the springboard for companies to undertake acquisitions of less 
successful competitors. This suggests that the corporate governance 
system, on its own, is not a decisive factor for or against partnership. 
However, we need to investigate more closely how corporate 
governance interacts with other factors that influence the 
sustainability of partnership, in particular market regulation, product 
market conditions and the dynamics of relations between management 
and unions at enterprise level. 
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b.  Regulation and partnership 
The nature of regulation has an important influence on the 
sustainability of partnership in employment relations through its 
impact on the hierarchy of stakeholder interests as well as its effect on 
conditions and requirements firms confront in their product markets. 
According to the Seewell union, ‘regulation is the pervading influence 
… ownership is not a distinct driver.’ Similarly, the personnel director 
at Warmwell told us that the ability of the company to pursue a long-
term strategy, while at the same time delivering year-on-year above 
average returns ‘very much depends … where regulation goes.’ The 
Cleanwell UK union, too, identified the regulation of Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) in the National Health Service (NHS) as a more 
significant influence on the sustainability of partnership practices than 
the continental European model of corporate governance. 
 
Regulations can serve as a complement to corporate governance 
through their influence on the relative position of stakeholder groups 
within the hierarchy of interests they support. From this perspective, 
the most supportive environment for partnership is one in which 
regulations buttress the relative position of employees. The regulation 
of PFI in the NHS provides a good example. With the objective of 
ensuring a high quality standard of service in this sector, PFI 
regulations in the NHS require evaluation of the employment-
relations records of firms who bid for contracts;42 they also entitle 
trade unions to interview and submit a report on short-listed bidders.43 
According to the guidelines, the underlying logic is that companies 
with poor labour relations and inadequate investment in staff often 
deliver a poor standard of service. We found strong evidence of the 
supportive role of PFI regulation in the NHS in the case of Cleanwell 
UK, which has been particularly successful in this area. Cleanwell UK 
currently holds ten contracts with an annual turnover of over £30 
million. As a result of the relative success of Cleanwell UK’s 
partnership approach in this environment, more and more firms in the 
NHS PFI market have been building partnership into their relations 
with employees. It is important to note that employers’ support for the 
terms of PFI regulations in the NHS has had an influence on the 
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content of regulation. According to Cleanwell UK’s union, ‘if the 
NHS contractor employers had opposed the idea of trade unions being 
on selection panels … it might not have gone through.’ 
 
Health and safety regulations can also serve as a support for the 
relative position of employees in the hierarchy of stakeholders. This is 
evident in the case of Fixwell, an electrical contracting firm, in an 
industry where health and safety legislation is strong and there are 
significant costs associated with failure to comply. According to 
Fixwell’s Personnel Director, customers are prepared to pay a 
premium because ‘the cost of getting health and safety wrong is 
higher than the premium they pay to Fixwell for getting it right.’ He 
welcomed harsher health and safety regulation as a way of ‘leveling 
up’ the playing field.  
 
Regulation can also serve as a constraint on partnership if it fails to 
support employee interests or if it places other stakeholders above 
employees in the hierarchy. The regulatory environment in 
telecommunications and utilities, in contrast to the PFI regime, is seen 
by unions in those sectors as failing to represent employee interests. 
According to the union at Seewell, ‘it needs to be built into the 
regulation that the interests of employees as stakeholders in the 
business are explicitly recognised and some duty, however 
formulated, is given to the regulator to balance the interests of 
employees, especially health and safety.’ This concern was echoed by 
the union at Hearwell, which recently made a submission to the 
regulator about the failure of current regulation to represent the 
interests of employee stakeholders. 
 
Although telecommunications and utilities regulation gives 
precedence to stakeholder constituencies other than employees (i.e., 
customers, capital providers and the community interest in the 
environment), we nevertheless found evidence of other respects in 
which this form of regulation could provide support for partnership in 
employment relations. This relates to the influence of such regulations 
on quality standards and time horizons. 
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The imposition of guaranteed customer service standards by the 
regulators serves as a significant support mechanism for partnership 
because it means that pressures to cut costs cannot be permitted to 
undermine standards of customer service. 44 According to the 
Managing Director of Flowell, ‘the whole thing is driven by customer 
service.’ This is important because regulators themselves intensify the 
pressure to cut costs and increase efficiency by imposing price 
controls. In the UK, regulation has tended to restrict price increases to 
customers to levels below the increase in the retail price index, 
through a formula expressed as RPI – X. Regulatory price controls 
have had a substantial impact on several of the companies in our 
study. For example, Hearwell has reduced prices by £1.8 billion over 
the last three financial years, largely as a result of the regulatory 
formulae. Flowell is required to reduce prices by 14.3 percent in real 
terms this year and by a further 2.3 percent in real terms over the next 
four years. Seewell’s generation business will see revenue reduced by 
28 percent this year and 3 per cent per annum for the next four years. 
Price controls will adversely impact Warmwell’s operating profit by 
£127 million in 2000-01. In themselves, price controls potentially 
serve as a constraint on partnership because of the likelihood that they 
will lead to restructuring and manpower reductions.  
 
However, when taken together, price controls and customer service 
requirements may provide strong incentives for active partnership to 
be sought as a way of enhancing the level of performance. At both 
Seewell and Hearwell, the unions told us that high guaranteed 
standards of customer service provide an effective bargaining tool in 
negotiations over cost cutting: ‘[t]he vulnerable area is customer 
relationships and if those are disrupted, then there are various means 
through the regulator and other bodies that they will be brought to 
account. So that’s advantageous to us.’ Several of our interviewees 
said that the regulator is perceived to be a ‘common enemy’ that 
brings the unions and management together to find solutions in the 
face of seemingly contradictory pressures to reduce costs, meet 
quality and service standards and maintain profitability.  
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Telecommunications and utilities regulations can also extend time 
horizons by tempering the expectations of capital providers and 
extending operating parameters. By allowing for capital providers ‘a 
return that is sufficient, but no more than sufficient,’45 these 
regulations temper the expectations of institutional investors, 
facilitating a longer-term view that is conducive to partnership. 
Regulators make assessments for costs of debt, costs of equity and 
dividend yields in their price determinations.46 They also set the 
operating parameters for periods of up to five years. According to the 
water regulator, financing costs have fallen as ‘financial markets have 
adapted to the position of privatised utilities’.47 At the same time, 
regulators’ assessments of returns on capital are indicative and not 
prescriptive;48 regulators determine the level of prices but leave it to 
companies to manage their level of profits. As a result, this form of 
regulation still provides only a very weak support mechanism for 
partnership in itself; it is open to companies operating under this 
regime to decide whether or not to opt for a proactive approach to 
partnership.  
 
Nevertheless, the stress on customer service in utility regulation can 
serve to encourage active partnership in conjunction with the 
operation of the take-over mechanism. Warmwell, with a particularly 
strong labour-management partnership and an active role in the 
market for corporate control, illustrates this point. Warmwell’s bid for 
another UK utility company was assisted by the publication by the 
regulator of information relating to levels of customer service and 
organisational costs in companies which had recently been privatised. 
On this basis, Warmwell was able to benchmark its own performance 
against industry standards and identify a suitable target for 
acquisition: 
‘The skills that we built through benchmarking were just the same 
ones that we needed to evaluate potential acquisitions… We looked 
at [the target] and said we know what it can do: its costs per 
customer, per kilometre of line, its fault rates and so on were all in 
the public domain from the regulatory process. We knew the 
international benchmarking levels possible from looking at … 
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other leading companies. We could say - if that company was 
under our control, this is what it would be worth to us. We then 
looked at what we would have to pay for it.’ 
 
The information generated by regulation was used by the company to 
exploit what it considered to be its comparative advantage in being 
better able than the target to meet high standards of service. In that 
sense, as in the case of PFI which we considered earlier, the 
regulatory process can be said to have had a bias in favour of 
companies which relied on a strong partnership ethic to enhance their 
performance. 
 
Regulation also influences partnership its influence on conditions in 
product markets. In this sense, partnership is most supported when 
regulations stabilise markets and buffer firms from destructive 
competitive pressures. The example of PFI in the NHS provides a 
good example because of its limiting effect on competition. The 
opposite case is that where the aim of regulation is market 
liberalisation, as in the case of Tenswell UK. Liberalised markets are 
intensely competitive, adding to the pressures that must be resolved 
within the productive system, and making partnership with employees 
more difficult. 
 
Overall, the case studies demonstrate that although market regulation 
can serve as both a constraint and a support for partnership in 
employee relations, its effect can be highly significant. Nevertheless, 
as in the case of the corporate governance factors that we looked at 
above, the effect of market regulation should not be overstated. If the 
regulatory environment were the sole or main determining factor, we 
would expect to find similar sorts of partnership arrangements 
developing in firms that are operating in the same regulatory 
environment. However, this is not the case. Flowell, Seewell and 
Warmwell provide a good example of diversity of responses to a 
similar environment, as all operate in the utilities sector. We found 
strong evidence of mature and pro-active partnership in the case of 
Warmwell, with HR strategy at the forefront of business strategy and 
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a positive role for unions at the national and local level and on the 
company training board. However, we found little evidence of 
partnership at Flowell and evidence of what might be described as 
‘reactive partnership’ at Seewell, where partnership was essentially 
concerned with the management of downsizing and redundancies.  
 
We now turn to examination of the impact of product markets on 
partnership in employment relations. 
 
c. Product markets and partnership 
As discussed above, regulations can have an effect on both the nature 
of the product (through the imposition of standards for price and 
quality) as well as on product market condition (through regulation 
aimed at market liberalisation). In both cases, this has an influence on 
partnership in employment relations. The nature of competition in a 
particular market, with or without intervening regulation, has an 
impact on the sustainability of partnership in employment relations. 
This relates to the nature of the product or service, and hence the 
relative contribution of partnership to the firm’s ability to produce and 
distribute it effectively.  
 
High quality market niches, particularly in services, benefit most from 
partnership in production. At Fixwell, for example, the personnel 
director told us that ‘we sell on high quality, high safety, an excellent 
job, and we get that from having a well trained stable workforce.’ 
This is also demonstrated by the commercial strategy of Cleanwell 
UK, which is increasingly moving away from general cleaning 
services and into specialised multi-services provision and facilities 
management. According to its 2000 Annual Report, service delivery 
in these markets is more complex, knowledge intensive and 
sophisticated, and characterised by a high degree of operational 
integration with customers.  
 
Provision of services also influences the effectiveness of partnership 
in employment relations because of the close proximity of employees 
and customers. According to Fixwell’s Personnel Director, ‘At the 
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end of the day, all we have to offer our customers is the skills that our 
people have. We don’t manufacture anything. All we sell is the skills 
of our people, so we spend a lot of time and money devoted to 
training, technical training, management development.’ Similarly, the 
Finance Director at Cleanwell UK identified employees as the most 
important stakeholder group because ‘without employees, Cleanwell 
is nothing and would be unable to achieve its goals. … Sustainability 
boils down to employees.’  
 
The nature of competition is also a factor in the firm’s ability to 
maintain partnership in employment relations. In general, the more 
volatile a market, the greater the pressures operating on the firm and 
the more difficult to maintain partnership, whereas sectors 
characterised by high technical barriers to entry and managed 
competition is conducive to partnership. We found evidence of this in 
the case of Fixwell, a company with a culture of partnership. 
According to Fixwell’s Personnel Director, with the intensification of 
competitive pressures, the company has become ‘less patient’ with the 
trade unions. At Tenswell, too, the high degree of competitive 
pressures and the need to be responsive to volatile market conditions 
has made partnership difficult, if not impossible to achieve. 
 
In cases where competition is limited, partnership is much easier to 
maintain. Cleanwell UK’s experience in the PFI market in NHS 
provides a good example. In this case, Cleanwell UK’s reputation for 
partnership in employment relations is much better in the NHS than in 
other market segments where competitive pressures are greater, such 
as the privatised railways. According to Cleanwell UK’s union, in the 
NHS PFI market, ‘the big five, between them, control 85 percent of 
the market. The small companies are all being edged out.’ The union 
pointed out that there are high barriers to entry associated with 
running a NHS building. ‘There are a lot of risks … so [NHS bodies] 
tend to go with people they know which has helped [Cleanwell].’ 
Furthermore, ‘because of the nature of the contracts, you have to be 
pretty big.’ Moreover, PFI contracts are typically awarded for 25-30 
years and ‘it is very unlikely that the contract will be taken away from 
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the PFI company that gets it in the first place.’ The union said that this 
meant that Cleanwell could look at the long- term profitability of PFI 
contracts and so ‘the degree of conflict in the first few years is 
lessened.’ By contrast, in the railway marketplace there were many 
medium and small sized companies competing for short-term 
contracts, primarily on the basis of price. The Managing Director of 
Cleanwell UK said that this constrained the Cleanwell approach 
because, ‘we have to bear it in mind because otherwise we would lose 
a lot of business.’  
 
Competitive pressures are not deterministic of the effectiveness of 
partnership in employment relations, however. According to the union 
at Hearwell, partnership in its mobile phones business is less 
developed than in networks because of differences in the cultural 
maturity of the two businesses rather than the fact that competitive 
pressures are greater in the mobile phones sector that they are in fixed 
networks.  
 
The above analysis perhaps helps to explain why we see little, if any, 
evidence of Partnership at Tenswell. Not only is share ownership 
highly dispersed (nearly 90 percent of which is Anglo-American) but 
there is also an absence of environmental support mechanisms for 
partnership. Over 80 percent of the workforce is engaged in the 
production of a product where markets are volatile and price sensitive 
and there is substantial global over-supply. Regulation has been aimed 
at increasing the intensity of national competition through the removal 
of barriers to trade, and the market is unregulated in terms of price 
and quality standards.  
 
The case of Flowell is an apparent contradiction because despite a 
favourable corporate governance, regulatory and market environment, 
its record on partnership is poor. As a water utility company, Flowell 
operates as a regional monopoly, and is required to meet very high 
regulatory standards. It is also wholly owned by a continental 
European parent. In this case, the problem relates to weakness in the 
local union and the management of partnership.  
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We now examine the influence of micro-level factors at the level of 
the enterprise itself, and in particular the dynamics of partnership 
relations between managers and union officers.  
 
d. Micro-level factors and the management of partnership 
The macro-level environment (that is to say, corporate governance, 
regulation, and product market conditions) has an indisputable 
influence on partnership in employment relations. However, it is the 
quality and strength of management and union leadership at local 
level and the way in which these pressures are managed that is 
perhaps most important in determining the durability and 
effectiveness of partnership. 
 
The quality and vision of company management at all levels of the 
organisation, from the strategic level on down, contributed 
significantly to the effectiveness of partnership in the companies we 
studied. At the strategic level, appreciation of the relationship 
between HR and the company’s ability to achieve its business 
objectives, coupled with a vision for how partnership might be 
incorporated into this approach was a critical factor. This was evident 
at Warmwell, where HR is now recognised as adding real value to the 
business, rather than ‘people administration.’ According to the 
Director of Personnel, ‘HR strategy is equally as important, not 
anymore so, not any less so, than the financial, commercial and 
engineering strategy. It is by playing all the strands at the same time 
that we get the key strength.’ In this case, board membership of an 
individual manager with responsibility for HR served as the catalyst 
for moving HR strategy to the forefront of the company’s business 
strategy. Similarly, Fixwell’s Personnel Director underlined the 
complementary relationship between its HR strategy and business 
strategy by contrasting Fixwell’s long-term approach to that of the 
electrical contracting industry in general. At Fixwell, approximately 
90 percent of the workforce is permanent compared with an industry 
average of 70 percent agency and subcontracted labour. ‘What we get 
from that is a stable workforce … that’s well trained … is high quality 
… We sell on high quality, high safety, an excellent job, and we get 
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that from having a well-trained, stable workforce.’ A strategic vision 
for partnership is also evident at Cleanwell International, whose 1999 
Annual Report says: 
‘The extent to which we fulfil our responsibilities to our 
employees, customers, and society at large will continue to be a 
measure or our success on an equal footing with our financial 
performance.’ 
 
At the operational level, the effectiveness and durability of 
partnership is influenced by how well the company manages the 
environmental pressures (corporate governance, regulations, product 
markets) to which it is subject. As we have seen, particularly 
important in this respect is the management of shareholder 
expectations. This is evident in a comparison of Seewell and 
Warmwell, which compete in the multi-utility market. Seewell’s 
union contrasted the short-term approach of Seewell’s previous 
management, who were concerned with delivering returns over one 
year, with the longer-term approach taken by management of 
Warmwell. According to the union representative we talked with at 
Seewell, shareholder pressures should not be used as an excuse for 
short-termism and performance difficulties because shareholders 
expect only what they are promised by management. The union at 
Hearwell also stressed the importance of the role of management as 
‘an interface’ between the investment community, the regulator, 
customers and workers. This was particularly evident during the 
massive restructuring following privatisation when Hearwell’s CEO 
had acted as a buffer between the union and the board to ensure that 
there were no compulsory redundancies. The role of a ‘hard hitting’ 
HR Director who could persuade the board and deliver on 
commitments, was also seen as integral to effective partnership 
relations at Hearwell. According to the union, partnership is ‘not just 
a piece of paper that sets out procedures. It is about identifying issues, 
behaviours of trust and delivering high quality outputs.’  
 
The negative influence of poor quality management was also evident 
in our cases. At Seewell, for example, the union leader explained how 
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a ‘macho’ management style in one part of the business had 
undermined partnership in that section, despite relative good 
relationships in other sections of the business. Similarly, Tenswell 
UK’s union described the adverse effects of this type of management 
style on employee relationships in one of its plants. 
 
The strength and sophistication of the union is also vitally important 
for the success of partnership. In this, union strength depends not only 
on union density but also on its ability to effectively represent the 
interests of its membership at both the national and local levels. Its 
sophistication is shaped by an ability to understand and explain to 
membership the pressures operating on employers, the mutuality of 
interests in finding a way forward and the contribution of partnership 
to that process.  
 
A weak and/or adversarial union (at the national and / or local level) 
can be an impediment to partnership. At Flowell, for example, despite 
an improvement in union density, from 40 percent in 1998 to 50 
percent in 2001 (resulting from the successful recruitment campaign 
of a large union), the local union is weak and ineffective. According 
to the Managing Director, the union had only been recognised as a 
result of the passage of the Employment Relations Act 1999.49 Under 
this legislation, it would have been possible for the union to mount a 
legal challenge, requiring the company to recognise it for the purposes 
of collective bargaining. A previous Managing Director, when 
interviewed in 1998, said about relations with the union: ‘what 
relations, we never see them.’ 
 
Variation in the success and maturity of partnership across different 
business segments of the same company was also apparent in several 
of the cases in this study, suggesting that relationship and union 
leadership at the operational level influences partnership. Seewell’s 
personnel director told us that ‘there’s not just one picture of 
[Seewell] … it doesn’t work like that … we’ve got some very good 
examples of partnership, but these examples are where the unions 
have an active membership.’ At Seewell, union density varies from 
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over 80 percent in power generation and networks to less than 10 
percent in trading, which is viewed as a more individualistic and 
professional business area. Similarly, at Hearwell, there are different 
partnership models in different parts of the business. In general, the 
older the product and the more experienced the parties to the 
relationship are, the more mature and deep the partnership. This is 
evident in the fact that Hearwell’s partnership model is much more 
mature in the networks sector than in the newer mobile sector. In 
networks, union density is 99 percent and union and management 
have extensive experience with each other and with the product.  
 
However, the unions at Hearwell and Seewell viewed the future of 
partnership very differently, providing insight into the nature and 
degree of partnership at the two companies. At Hearwell the union 
was confident that the culture of partnership would develop over time 
in all product areas, even the newer lines, whereas Seewell’s union 
told us that the company was ‘not being particularly helpful to the 
unions in expanding membership in areas where the business is 
developing.’ 
 
More important than union density is the quality of union leadership. 
The ability of the union to take a strategic approach is very important. 
According to Hearwell’s personnel director, 
‘The unions themselves have become more and more realistic in terms 
of what it means to be a private company in terms of what their role 
is, how they can participate in a strategic debate…they have been well 
served over that period by the national leadership.’ 
 
A strategic approach to partnership has also been adopted by the 
union at Cleanwell UK, which is fundamentally opposed to PFI and 
contracting out in the public sector.  
‘We don’t actually agree with the fact that [Cleanwell] should 
have the contract in the first place … [However] we have to deal 
with the world as it is rather than as we would like it to be. So, if 
private sector employers are going to be awarded contracts … we 
have taken the view that it is better that we have a partnership 
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arrangement with those employers, rather than a wholly 
conflictual one.’ 
 
Union leadership is also important at the operational level. According 
to Hearwell’s personnel director, the union was ‘prepared to manage 
the inevitable activists … you had a high degree of respect on both 
sides which helps.’ By contrast, the personnel director at Fixwell said 
that recently appointed new union leaders were ‘less partnership 
orientated.’ At Seewell, the union told us that disagreement between 
the three recognised unions was a constraint on partnership with the 
company. 
 
It is at this operational level that the true effectiveness of partnership 
is manifest. According to the union at Seewell, the attitude of 
management is that ‘this is our agenda, these are our decisions, we 
make them, we implement them. It’s not actually we don’t want to 
deal with unions, it’s just that we own the problem and we’re going to 
drive it.’ By contrast, the personnel director at Warmwell (Seewell’s 
competitor) told us that ‘Trade unions in many ways assist me in 
solving my problems. They solve problems for me before they even 
come to my attention.’ Fixwell’s personnel director echoed this view: 
They help us to manage change, you know a lot of the change that we 
have needed to introduce within the business would not have been 
managed without the involvement of the trade unions. They do a lot 
of work in communicating to staff and they provide a good check and 
balance as well…Commercial pressures on the business will always 
pressure us into doing things…a bit of check and balance which the 
trade union provides helps us to see that perhaps we’re not being as 
reasonable as we could be. So, they do a good job for us.’ 
 
The personnel director at Hearwell also highlighted the important role 
of the union as ‘a very effective communication channel and a 
persuasion channel.’ 
 
There are, then, important differences in the conception of partnership 
that emerges from the dynamics of enterprise-level relations between 
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unions and management. In most of the cases we studied, 
‘partnership’ was defined as ‘working together to achieve a common 
objective’. However, variation in that objective had an importance 
influence on the type of partnership that developed. In cases where the 
objective was to deliver a high quality/value product or service to 
consumers, or to jointly find a way forward in the face of market or 
regulatory opportunities and challenges, the partnership tended to be 
pro-active and mature. In contrast, where the objective was to manage 
the execution of redundancies or plant closure, it was re-active and 
unstable. 
 
V. Conclusions  
 
While the UK system of corporate governance may operate as a 
constraint, it also provides opportunity for publicly traded firms to 
pursue partnership with their various stakeholder groups, in particular 
with employees. As a constraint, the nature of shareholder pressure 
varies depending upon how companies choose to manage investor 
expectations. Companies that succeed in building a long-term 
orientation into relations with shareholders have an important degree 
of flexibility in managing their way through the other pressures to 
which they are subject (i.e., product market pressures and regulatory 
pressures). For these firms, the corporate governance system offers an 
opportunity to gain an important competitive edge by demonstrating 
their ability to better handle conflicting pressures than rivals. Other 
cases suggest that when confronted with a range of unfavourable 
conditions (i.e., corporate governance prioritises short-term 
shareholder returns; product markets are volatile and have turned 
against the UK-based operations; and regulation supports open trans-
national competition), partnership may be very difficult to construct 
and maintain, even if production system stakeholders would choose 
partnership for their very survival.  
 
At the same time, the case studies demonstrate that the nature and 
structure of share ownership is not the only corporate governance 
factor that influences the sustainability of partnership policies. There 
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are different layers of governance in different legal and economic 
systems that can buttress the rights of employee stakeholders, and so 
create a more conducive environment for partnership in employment 
relations. From this perspective, a governance model of co-
determination can be seen to more closely align the different 
stakeholder interests. This is evident at Cleanwell International where 
three of the nine members of the board of directors are employee 
representatives. Another way in which the legal environment can 
support employee interests is to provide extensive consultation rights. 
For example, the critical issue for the Union at Tenswell was that it 
believed the company’s UK employees were treated less favourably 
than the company’s employees in another European country. 
According to the union, this was because legislation in that country 
requires comprehensive information sharing and joint consultation; 
and decisions regarding plant closures must be made transparent 
because they are subject to judicial scrutiny. 
 
However, it should not be assumed that a governance model of 
codetermination would necessarily enhance partnership in the UK. In 
only one case did a union representative favour some form of co-
determination, on the basis that although the Union was ‘woven into 
the fabric of the business’ in terms of information and consultation, 
‘the fabric of that weaving could be easily unraveled.’ In all other 
cases (even Tenswell UK, with a restricted and reactive form of 
partnership), although the unions favoured consultation and collective 
bargaining, they opposed co-determination in the form of employee 
representation on the board. At Hearwell, a company with a mature 
and strong partnership culture, the union saw no merit in worker-
directors. Moreover, the union at Cleanwell UK, which also had a 
proactive form of partnership, argued that co-determination would 
serve as a constraint on partnership because of the union’s need to 
maintain credibility with, and the trust of, its membership. As a result, 
it preferred an arms’ length relationship with the company.  
 
The example of employee share options provides further evidence that 
effective partnership is not guaranteed simply by more closely 
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aligning the interests of employees, management and shareholders 
through financial instruments. The union at Hearwell told us that, 
paradoxically, employee share ownership exerted a negative influence 
on partnership. This is because as employees saw their investments 
fall in value, qua investors, they brought pressure on the union 
leadership to publicly attack the perceived failings of the company’s 
management and board, an attitude which union leadership believed 
would be detrimental to the partnership relationship. 
 
Nor does legal pressure for employee representation, in itself, 
promote effective partnership relationships. The union at Cleanwell 
UK spoke of a competitor that had ‘long running hostilities’ towards 
the union. According to the union, even with more supportive 
legislation ‘unless [x] changed their approach, what we would have is 
regulated conflict…people would be forced to deal with one another, 
but they would fall out at almost every opportunity.’  
 
Thus, although the UK model of corporate governance may not 
provide the ideal environment in which to sustain partnership, simply 
transplanting a different governance framework is no guarantee that 
partnership will flourish in the UK system of industrial relations. 
 
In so far as policy intervention can make a difference, its effectiveness 
depends upon altering the environment within which partnership 
strategies are developed and implemented. The case studies 
demonstrate that, in determining how to respond to the governance 
constraint, corporate actors have a strategic space in which to develop 
solutions of various kinds. In this, the quality of both management 
and union leadership at the company level are vital. Strong and 
strategically-minded managers who are willing to stand up to the 
board in support of long-term production-level interests are better able 
to manage the constraints and pressures operating on the firm in such 
a way as to reconcile the expectations of the different stakeholders. 
The willingness of top management to support partnership against 
external questioning and scrutiny from shareholders can provide 
confidence to partners that it will be defended, thereby engendering 
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trust. A strong union with an understanding of the industry, the 
pressures to which the firm is subject and a cohesive and sophisticated 
approach to partnership through the good times and the bad, as well as 
the ability to manage and mediate both employees and managers, is 
also important.  
 
However, a finding that emerges from our studies concerns the critical 
position of the board. Both top management and the union are 
vulnerable to board-level pressure since in response to stock market 
concerns, the board can unilaterally eliminate top management. It can 
also take steps to sell or merge the firm. Both of these approaches 
have the potential to severely damage production system relationships 
and viability, and are largely out of the control of management and 
the union. In companies like Hearwell, for example, that are subject to 
intense scrutiny from the financial markets and frequent 
pronouncements on the company’s strategy from institutional 
investors, relations between the non-executive directors, on the one 
hand, and board-level executives (in particular the CEO), on the other, 
play a vital role in shaping the conditions for and against partnership.  
 
In short, the relationship between corporate governance and 
partnership in employment relations is complex and characterised by 
dynamic interaction and feedback effects. Regulatory requirements 
and product market conditions which are largely unavoidable can 
interact with each other and with the system of corporate governance 
in ways that either support or constrain efforts to maintain partnership 
with employees. Corporate governance is rarely a determining factor 
in its own right. But, when coupled with these other environmental 
forces, corporate governance can influence the choice of strategy by 
both union and management. While some UK companies have been 
able to reconcile shareholder demands with a ‘partnership’ approach, 
in other cases, shareholder pressure has undermined partnership 
relations of the kind which have endured under more concentrated 
forms of ownership. The crucial point seems to be that the attitude of 
shareholders, rather than the nature of share ownership, can serve as a 
constraint or support for partnership. As evident in the case of 
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Tenswell UK, the framework of UK corporate governance constrains 
partnership because it inadequately buttresses the consultation rights 
of employee stakeholders. In contrast, the cases of Warmwell and 
Hearwell demonstrate that successful partnership arrangements can be 
sustained despite dispersed share ownership and a high level of take-
over activity. In these cases, corporate governance can be said to 
support partnership, but only in conjunction with market regulation 
underpinning quality standards, relative stability in product markets. 
Also critical is the willingness of senior management to mediate 
between the claims of different stakeholder groups and the ability of 
the union to effectively represent its members’ interests. 
 
The effectiveness of a partnership approach, then, cannot be separated 
from its broader environmental context. The dominant system of 
corporate governance, in combination with the firm’s market and 
regulatory framework may serve to encourage or to constrain more 
micro-level efforts at co-operation by influencing the terms and 
conditions for, and the durability of, partnership in production. Within 
this context, governance systems can be viewed as successive 
layerings, from the level of the work system to norms that operate at a 
national or trans-national level. Each layer of governance forms a 
significant part of the environment in which the lower levels operate. 
These layers of governance may also interact with, moderate or 
magnify external market and regulatory pressures operating on the 
productive system. Although not the only factor, corporate 
governance therefore has an important influence on the ability of 
parties to develop and maintain partnership relationships at various 
organisational levels. It also plays a role in allocating the resulting 
costs and benefits, and hence the returns to partnership. Therefore, the 
ability of management to honour commitments made to their 
workforce in exchange for workers’ acceptance of the additional skill, 
effort and responsibility needed for effective partnership will depend 
upon the institutional and economic environment in which the 
agreements are made and implemented.  
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Table 1:  Case Study Characteristics:  Environmental Factors 
 
       Cleanwell Fixwell Flowell Hearwell Warmwell Seewell Tenswell 
 
Sector 
 
Specialised contract 
cleaning & facilities 
maintenance 
 
Electrical Contracting 
 
Multi-utility:      
water & gas 
 
Telecommunications 
 
Multi-utility: 
Electricity, gas, water 
 
Multi-utility: 
electricity & gas 
 
Manufacturer:   
Heavy Industry 
 
Ownership 
(degree of 
dispersion, 
stock exchange 
listings) 
 
 Concentrated: 
European parent     
 
 Stock 
Exchanges: 
Copenhagen 
 
 
 Concentrated:    
UK Management 
Buyout 
 Not listed 
 
 Concentrated: 
European parent 
 
 Stock 
Exchanges: Madrid 
 
 
 Dispersed:         
UK parent   
 
 Stock 
Exchanges: 
London & NY 
 
 Dispersed:         
UK parent 
 
 Stock 
Exchanges: 
London & NY 
 
 Dispersed:          
US parent 
 
 Stock 
Exchanges: NY 
 
 
 Dispersed:   
Merger between 
UK & Euro parent 
 Stock 
Exchanges:  
London, NY & 
Amsterdam 
 
Partnership 
 
 
Pro-active 
partnership in UK 
 
Pro-active 
partnership  
 
Little evidence of 
partnership in UK 
 
Pro-active & re-
active partnership 
 
Pro-active & re-
active partnership 
 
Re-active  
partnership in UK 
 
No evidence of 
partnership in UK 
 
Regulation  
(stakeholder 
representation, 
industry 
regulations) 
 
 Employee 
interests dominate 
in PFI 
 Regulations:  
quality in NHS, 
health & safety 
 
 
 
 Regulations: 
predominantly 
health & safety 
 
 Customer 
interests  dominate 
 Regulations:  
price, quality 
service, financing,  
competition, 
environment 
 
 Customer 
interests  dominate 
 Regulations:  
price, quality 
service, financing, 
competition, 
environment 
 
 
 Customer interests  
dominate 
 Regulations:  price, 
quality service, 
financing, 
competition, 
environment  
 
 Customer 
interests  dominate 
 Regulations:  
price, quality 
service, financing, 
competition, 
environment 
 
 
 
 Regulations 
minimal: 
environment,   
health & safety 
 
Product 
Markets 
(product type, 
degree & 
nature of 
competition, 
supply 
relations) 
 
 
 General 
cleaning:  price 
competitive 
 Specialised 
svces: competition 
on the basis of 
quality, given 
price. fewer, 
larger 
competitors. 
reputation 
important 
 
 Electrical 
contracting 
services  
 Operates across 
different markets.  
 Mainly high 
quality  
 Mainly medium 
size contracts.  
 
 Multi-utility 
services 
 Generally very 
limited 
competition, 
although energy 
retail market open 
to competition 
 
 Services & 
products: 
specialised & 
technologically 
sophisticated  
 Competitive 
market: price & 
quality  
 Long-term 
relations 
 
 Multi-utility 
services 
 Generally very 
limited 
competition, 
although energy 
retail market open 
to competition  
 
 Multi-utility 
services 
 Generally very 
limited 
competition, 
although energy 
retail market open 
to competition 
 
 Mass produced, 
manufactured 
goods 
 Intense competition 
on basis of price 
and satisfactory 
quality 
 Volatile & difficult 
market conditions 
 Short-term 
relations 
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 Long-term 
contracts in PFI 
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Table 2:  Case Study Characteristics:  Micro-level Factors 
 
       Cleanwell Fixwell Flowell Hearwell Warmwell Seewell Tenswell 
 
Corporate 
Structure 
 
 Multi-site 
 Multi-country  
 
 Multi-site 
 UK 
 
 Multi-plant 
 Multi-country 
 
 Multi-plant 
 Multi-country 
 
 Multi plant 
 UK & US 
 
 Multi-plant 
 Multi country 
 
 Multi-plant 
 Multi-country  
 
Union Strength 
(density, 
effective 
representation) 
 
 Density: 35% 
overall, 60% in 
NHS 
 Effective 
representation of 
membership 
 
 Density: 50% 
 New leadership 
at local level said 
to be less 
partnership 
orientated 
 
 Density: 50% 
(up from 40% two 
years ago) 
 Weak 
representation at 
local level 
 
 Density: 60% 
Overall, 99% in 
networks  
 Effective 
representation of 
membership 
 
 Density: 45% 
overall, 66% of 
staff covered by 
collective 
agreements 
 Effective 
representation of 
membership 
 
 Density: over 
80% in generating 
and networks, less 
than 10% in trading 
 Internal 
divisions among 
Seewell unions 
 
 Density:            
80% overall, 100% 
blue collar 
 Internal 
divisions 
 Redundancies 
eroding UK 
membership base 
 
Aspects of 
Partnership 
 
 Pro-active 
 
 Voluntary 
 Mature and 
deep, especially in 
NHS 
 Joint 
consultation & 
dialogue 
 HR policy 
supports business 
objectives & 
partnership  
 Union 
involvement in 
working through 
challenges 
 Recognition of 
mutual interests 
 
 Pro-active 
 
 Unions seen by 
management as an 
effective check and 
balance against 
commercial 
pressures. 
 HR policy 
supports business 
objectives & 
partnership 
 
 Very little 
 
 Union only 
recognised as a 
result of legislation 
 Works council 
with union and 
independent 
representatives 
 Culture of 
insecurity 
 
 Pro-active &         
re-active 
 Voluntary 
 Mature, 
especially in 
traditional lines 
 Joint 
consultation & 
dialogue 
 HR policy 
supports business 
objectives & 
partnership  
 Union 
involvement in 
working through 
challenges 
 Recognition of 
mutual interests 
 
 Pro-active & re-
active 
 
 Divisional and 
local joint bodies 
to develop 
awareness of 
business plan and 
objectives. 
 HR policy 
supports business 
objectives & 
partnership  
 Union 
involvement in 
working through 
challenges 
 Recognition of 
mutual interests 
 
 Re-active 
 
 Much 
information & 
consultation in 
some parts of 
business but 
individualisation in 
other parts. 
 Union not 
involved at all in 
strategy 
 Union used to 
manage 
downsizing 
 Issues owned by 
management 
 
 Very little  
 
 Insufficient 
sharing of 
information & 
consultation, 
especially re: 
redundancies & 
plant closures 
 Union has no 
confidence in 
business strategy. 
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Table 3:  Corporate Mission and HR Philosophy 
 
       Cleanwell Fixwell Flowell Hearwell Warmwell Seewell Tenswell 
 
Mission 
statement 
 
“To advance the 
facility support
services industry and 
lead it globally. The 
Group aims to 
achieve this by being 
the preferred
employer in the 
industry, by offering 
customers global 
service concepts and 
solutions through a 
local organisation 
and by partnering 
with the customers to 
improve their 
competitiveness.” 
 
 
“Through enterprise, 
quality and high 
standards of customer 
service in electrical 
contracting, we will 
significantly add value 
for our customers.” 
  
“At the parent 
company, we are 
concerned about 
financial results, 
professionalism 
and the quality of 
our work. Attention 
to customer service 
and results are the 
core concerns.” 
 
“To be the most 
successful worldwide 
communications group. 
… we intend to build 
shareholder value by: 
seizing the many 
opportunities open to us 
in the global market; 
building our current 
business, focusing on 
high-growth areas; 
operating to the highest 
standards of integrity; 
fulfilling our 
responsibilities to the 
communities in which 
we operate.” 
 
“To be a committed 
builder of businesses, in 
electricity and utility-
related markets, 
determined to deliver 
outstanding 
performance. This is 
achieved by following 
the five values that 
support every company 
activity: well earned 
customer loyalty; 
enhanced shareholder 
value, positive working 
environment; trust of 
communities; teamwork 
& leadership.” 
 
“At the parent 
company we are 
concerned about 
financial results, 
professionalism 
and the quality of 
our work. Attention 
to customer service 
and results are the 
core concerns.” 
 
Tenswell is 
committed to 
achieving strategic 
growth by 
improving its 
competitive position 
and increasing 
product and service 
quality, in order to 
deliver customer 
satisfaction.  
 
HR and 
Partnership 
Philosophy 
 
“The extent to which 
we fulfil our 
responsibilities to 
our employees, 
customers, and 
society at large will 
continue to be a 
measure of our 
success on an equal 
footing with our 
financial 
performance.” 
 
“Gaining Investor in 
People status recognises 
the Company’s commit-
ment to the training & 
development of all 
employees & involving 
them in the develop-
ment of the business & 
all matters which affect 
their work. This is 
achieved primarily 
through a firm policy of 
communicating & 
consulting with 
employees by a variety 
of means.” 
 
“The experience of 
our highly
knowledgeable 
business 
professionals 
constitutes one of 
the company’s
most valuable
assets.” 
 
 
 
“[Hearwell] is 
committed to investing 
in and supporting its 
people with innovative, 
leading-edge policies 
and programmes, 
creating a working 
environment which 
embraces all aspects of 
diversity and allows 
people to achieve their 
real potential.” 
 
 
 
“[Warmwell] recruits 
and retains the best 
people, offering 
everyone opportunities 
to realise their 
potential. This is 
achieved through 
working together to a 
clear and common 
purpose.” 
 
“Employees are our 
greatest asset and 
the reason for the 
business’s 
successes with 
customers and 
communities.” 
 
“[Tenswell] is proud 
of its workforce and 
recognises the 
contribution made 
by its employees … 
employees are 
valued and much 
emphasis is placed 
on training and 
development. In this 
way [Tenswell] 
ensures its 
workforce is highly 
skilled and capable 
of delivering world 
class performance.” 
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